Dear AA,
I have been reading your accounts of the boer War, off and on and I must say you write history "exceedingly well," as Jane Austen would have said if she had read your accounts. I really enjoyed this piece. It shows the fog of war and sometimes there is all fog. No wonder people make reputations as generals who have no business commanding a flock of goats. Thank you for a delightful piece and looking forward to more of the same.
With all my best,
Tas
Arnald Almaric <(Address removed)> said:
To the west Methuen had started his advance on Kimberley. In order to prevent Boer raids into the Cape Colony the Army Corps had been split further with most of the cavalry under French and part of an infantry division under General Gatacre based around Colesburg and Stromberg.
Methuen advanced along the line of the railroad to Kimberley. In reality he had little choice but to follow this route. His objective was to relieve Kimberley, evacuate the civilian population including ~8,000 native African workers and one very annoying Cecil Rhodes, replenish the stores and withdraw. The oxen and mules were still to arrive in South Africa and so the only way the force could be supplied and the evacuation carried out was by rail.
Naturally this could also be worked out by the Boer Commandos. The Boer tactic was to fight, then retire having inflicted more casualties. At the Battle of Belmont on 23rd November Methuen forced the Boers under Prinsloo of the OFS from their positions but at a cost of 75 killed and 220 wounded. The field forces opposing Methuen were reinforced by Boers drawn from the sieges at Kimberley and Mafeking under the command of Koos De la Rey. (De la Rey had been sent as he was becoming a pain to General Pieter Cronje at the siege of Mafeking. He was making far too many good suggestions for Cronje’s liking).
Prinsloo and the Boers of his commando had been dispirited by their failure to stop Methuens advance. The British had accepted losses that were staggering to them but had kept coming. On November 25th at Rooilaagte the Naval Brigade took the Boer positions despite suffering near 50% casualties. Prinsloo was sidelined and the command handed over to De La Rey who set about establishing a position where the Modder and Riet Rivers met. De La Rey adopted the, for the time, unusual tactic of deploying his men not on the higher ground covering the Modder banks but on the low ground, using the river banks themselves as cover. For this the Modder (and Riet) were ideal, they had cut to a depth of about 30 feet into the plain and formed a natural gigantic trench. De La Rey reasoned that his men would be less exposed to British Artillery from this position and the flat trajectory that his own men’s fire would take would increase their accuracy. He was correct.
Pieter Cronje had by now come down from Mafeking to take charge but saw no reason to interfere with De La Rey’s preparations. By now the relations between the two generals were strained. Methuen had advanced to the position and attempted to make sense of the landscape versus what was printed on his maps. At this time he was unaware that there were ~3,000 Boers in front of him. He estimated the number from 0 to 400. Methuen considered the options of outflanking the position and sending his troops out on a wide march. Having compared the maps he had to reality and weighing in the balance that this would sever these troops from the railway and the line of supply decided that a frontal assault and the bravery of the British Infantryman would have to suffice.
On the morning of the 28th November the infantry advanced. When ~1,200 yards from the Modder river the banks of the river exploded with Mauser fire. The British Infantry became pinned down, scared to move for it attracted fire from the Boer positions. The only British success came on the Boer left flank where the Royal Artillery managed to lay down sufficient fire to cause the Boers to withdraw and some troops of the Scots Guards actually managed to cross the Modder and establish a position in some farmhouses and out buildings. For the remainder of the troops it was a case of lying down on the veldt and making themselves as inconspicuous a target as possible. Reaching for a water bottle was to invite a Boer marksman or more to “try their luck”. The Highland Battalions suffered the most. Wearing kilts into action the sun on the back of their knees and legs as they lay prone ensured they became sunburnt.
When night time fell both sides considered their options. Methuen decided to sit tight and renew the attack in the morning. The Boers decided to retreat, despite the urgings of De La Rey to stay and fight. De La Rey finally caught up with his son Adam, who had been wounded in the abdomen during the afternoon by shrapnel from the artillery late at night and placing his son in a blanket, (there were no ambulances), he and his aides carried his son on the road to Jacobsdal. Pieter Cronje and his staff came riding up behind this party. Cronje called out; ”Well Vechtgeneraal, how did the battle go” (in Afrikaans). At this De La Rey exploded and relations between the two men already strained disintegrated. Adam De la Rey died of his wounds around dawn on the 29th November 1899.
Methuen having discovered that the Boers had withdrawn sat at the banks of the Modder river accumulating stores and reinforcements. He completed repairs to the railway bridge. Methuen was in contact with the garrison at Kimberley through the use of searchlights signalling messages against the night sky, heliograph and even the odd messenger. (At the moment the action is about 20 miles south of Kimberley) He knew he had time to regroup. The Boers withdrew to a position at Magersfontein (about six miles away) and prepared a line of defences based on De La Rey’s plan. This was an extension of the plan used at the Modder. He would defend not the line of hills but the flat ground in front of them. Cronje disagreed and only the personal intervention of President Steyn stopped the argument. De La Reys plan would be used.
Methuen correctly guessed that the Boers would hold their next position in the Magersfontein Hills. He again declined to attempt an outflanking manoeuvre, despite the presence of the Boer wagons and supplies at Jacobsdal which were only lightly guarded. A factor may have been that also within these laagers were the Boers families. At this point it appears it was still a gentlemen’s war. On the 10th December he advanced and unleashed a preliminary bombardment on the Boer positions that were of course on the high ground, having no effect on the Boers at the base of the hills. A balloon had been sent amongst the military supplies and it was intended that it would be launched to observe the effect of the fire on the Boer positions, however rain prevented it from being launched. The orders were for the Highland Brigade to form up shortly after midnight on the 11th December and using the cover of the night to advance on the slopes. The attack would go in at dawn. The Guards would be held in reserve.
A night march of 4,000 men is not an easy task, however shortly before dawn the Highlanders were in position, still in close order, about 700 yards from the slopes and 400 yards from the Boer trenches. (Wauchope commanding the Highland Brigade had decided that the men would make best progress in close order and was about to order the men into extended order, creating a 5 yard interval between men, when they encountered some thorn bushes and Wauchope delayed giving the order until they had cleared them).
What alerted the Boers to the presence of the Highlanders is not clear, some Boer accounts give the explanation that trip wires attached to tin cans had been strung out in front of the positions. Some British accounts speak melodramatically of signal lanterns and spies. In truth the artillery bombardment the day before was as big a clue as anyone could have wished that an attack was imminent. What is certain is that the Boers opened fire at a range of 400 yards into a mass of men. Much of the Brigade had no alternative but to go to ground, some of the Brigade claimed to have heard the order to retire and did so. In short there was utter confusion.
There were some moments in the confusion that could have brought a victory. William MacFarlan, adjutant of the Black Watch found a hole in the Boer line and was leading a small group of men up the southeastern slope of Magersfontein when he was driven back by British Artillery fire on the area. (The artillery were still in the belief the main Boer position was on the high ground at this point). Lt. Robert Wilson managed to lead a party of ~ one hundred Seaforth Highlanders through the line and was making his own way up the hill. From the hill he could have put fire down onto the Boer trenches from reverse. In a fluke of war he was stopped by Piet Cronje and six of his aides who had got thoroughly lost attempting to inspect the positions in the dark. The Boers managed to plug the gap and the Seaforths surrendered as they were surrounded and by now the British artillery had also opened up on the area.
By midday the battle was a stalemate. Methuen sent orders that the Highlanders were to hang on until dark. He was hoping the Boers would withdraw in the night as they had on the Modder. The order never got through. The Highlanders were pinned down, the Boers safe in their trenches, except for the artillery that was beginning to plague them. At around 1:30 p.m. a commando form Fricksburg attempted to advance to a position whereby they could fire on the flanks of the Highland Brigade. Two companies of the Seaforths were ordered to withdraw slightly to meet this movement. It seems that the other officers, seeing this movement and being unaware of Methuen’s order believed that a general retirement had been ordered. Once the retire began it became a rout. Casualties during the retreat were heavier than during the advance. The men rallied about a mile form the Boer positions, around water carts in order to slake their thirst, at this point the Boer artillery opened up and a second retreat began.
Methuen counted the butchers bill; 205 killed, 690 wounded, 76 missing/prisoners. Total 971. Boer losses around 250 killed and wounded. Methuen withdrew to the line of the Modder. Kimberley would have to wait to be relieved.
The battle would make grim reading in The Times over breakfast in London. It was made grimmer still by the news from Stromberg. Gatacre had been ordered to hold Stromberg, then ordered to withdraw from it by Buller. Stromberg was an important railway junction and when it was occupied by the Boers it severed Gatacre’s communications with French. Re-enforced by a battalion of the Royal Scots and two batteries on the 5th December Gatacre felt he had enough troops with a battalion of the Northumberland Fusiliers and Irish Rifles, together with 300 mounted infantry and ~1,000 men drawn form local forces such as the Cape Mounted Rifles and Cape Police to retake Stromberg.
He gathered together approximately 2,700 men for the task. A now bizarre series of events unfolded. In short Gatacre’s plan was for a night march on the 9th December to surprise the Boers on the 10th December and take Stromberg. At the last moment he changed the route he was going to take but not all of his forces were informed of the change, so some took the western road from Molteno, others taking the original “central” road. The guides leading the western approach under Gatacre lost their way and instead of ending up on the flank of the Boers arrived in a valley between the two main Boer positions. Still in the dark, both from a lack of light and in complete ignorance of where they actually were they tried to sort the mess out.
In the meantime the force advancing down the central route had advanced retired and advanced again until the conflicting messages forced Colonel John Edge RAMC commanding this column (it included a Field Hospital) to the sound conclusion that no-one appeared to know what was going on. In light of this he decided to wait until someone who knew what was going on could tell him.
Meanwhile Gatacre had got the confusion sorted. At 3:45 a.m. on the 10th December Gatacre and his force was precisely where Gatacre had planned them to be. To his right where the heights he needed to take to dominate Stromberg. The problem was Gateacre didn’t know it. According to his calculations he was still several miles from his starting point for the attack. He marched on.
By now all of Gatacre’s force was scattered, lost and thoroughly confused. By dawn Gatacre’s column was strung out, weary and it can be assumed very pissed off (if I may venture such a term). The Boers it seems were unaware of all this stumbling about and were still in camp some few hundred yards away blissfully unaware.
If you think events cannot get more surreal, I think you are wrong. On the other side of a hill to Gateacre’s right was a Boer outpost. An unidentified Boer answering a call of nature went to the other side of the hill and about to answer the call saw the British troops. He sensibly hoisted up his trousers and raised the alarm. Mean time at the rear of the British Column some soldiers had come across a flock of sheep belonging to Louis Jacobus Van Zyl whose farmhouse lay nearby. The soldiers decided that a breakfast of roast mutton was infinitely more tempting than following the rest of the column and started to butcher some of the sheep. Van Zyl, who had no particular support for either cause, was disturbed to see British troops tramping across his land. However to slaughter the pregnant ewes of his flock was too much. He went to get his rifle.
Gatacre coming under fire ordered the Irish Rifles to seize a hill on his left as a defensible position. About three hundred men got it right, the rest of the infantry started to ascend a steep hill to the left. All the infantry gone Gatacre ordered the artillery into position. By now the sun was coming up and the gunners were having difficulty in finding targets. Some men were observed on a crest and with efficiency the Royal Artillery began to shell the troops who’d reached the crest of the steep hill they weren’t meant to be on.
In the rear Van Zyl started his own personal battle against the soldiers slaughtering his ewes.
Gatacre now ordered the sensible thing, recall and withdraw. After marching all night, stumbling about in the dark the forces made their way back to Molteno. At this point a determined attack by the Boers armed with mops could have resulted in the capture of the entire force, however if Gatacre wasn’t first rate, the Boer Commandants opposing him weren’t either and settled down to collect the spoils of the battlefield including a 12 pdr of the Royal Artillery and ammunition.
When the casualty list was consulted it came as a shock. British 29 killed, 57 wounded and 633 prisoners. The prisoners not knowing of the withdraw order had been left behind and surrounded. The Boer loss 6 dead, 27 wounded. Van Zyl was arrested, tried and acquitted for his actions. No jury could be found to condemn a man for protecting his flock, however his story has grown with the years, a man defying the British Empire to save his ewes.
Well, this is two out of the three battles of "Black Week" covered. The third, well, you'll have to wait till next week (at least) for the next thrilling? instalment and Buller vs. Botha at Colenso and the reaction in the Empire. I should have mentioned that there are already some Canadian and Australian troops in South Africa., however the great influx and the reaction of the South Africans to this is yet to come.
Duncan.
